In the theory of international law, opinions on the relationship between reprisals and denunciation or suspension of the application of an international treaty due to its breach (Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties) appear to be diametrically opposed. This confrontation raises serious questions about the legal nature of the two types of state reaction to an internationally wrongful act 1 The uncertainty and vagueness which thus result are reflected in the reports submitted to the United Nations International Law Commission (ILQ by Willem Riphagen, former Special Rapporteur on the issue of state responsibility. The problem now acquires a new dimension as the present Special Rapporteur Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz reviews his predecessor's proposals on measures which could be taken in response to an internationally wrongful act In fact Professor Arangio-Ruiz, in his third report on state responsibility, stressed the need for further research into this matter.
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In the prevailing view, there is a clear distinction between the two types of reaction to wrongful acts. Most international law treatises and manuals examine denunciation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach and reprisals from totally different perspectives. Conventional reactions are considered within the context of the law of treaties; reprisals are examined within the framework of state responsibility, as well as under other labels such as 'measures of coercion ', 'pressure', 3 or 'application of international law'. 4 These classifications are to a certain extent unavoidable. However,
I. The Conditions of the Reaction
There are four general conditions for the application of reprisals and denunciation or suspension of an international treaty: (a) a relationship between the wrongful act and the reaction thereto must exist; (b) a state (or several states) must have the legal capacity to react; (c) a state (or states) must qualify as the target of that reaction; and (d) certain procedural steps must be followed.
A. The Relationship Between the Wrongful Act and the Reaction
The wrongful act constitutes the ground as well as the legal basis for reprisals and for denunciation or suspension of the treaty according to Article 60 of me Vienna Convention of 1969. A common feature of these responses is that in themselves, i.e. in the absence of the wrongful act, they are contrary to the rules of international law. According to the traditional definition of the Institut de droit international, reprisals are measures of coercion derogatory to ordinary rules of me law of nations. 9 Similarly, denunciation or suspension of the operation of a treaty, to the extent that they may lead to the non-performance of obligations under the treaty, are contrary to the general principle pacta sunt servanda. Reprisals and denunciation or suspension are lawful only when viewed in connection with the wrongful act that provokes them and along with the concurrence of other conditions. In other words, the prior wrongful act functions as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness.
From this perspective of the relationship between wrongful act and reaction, we must also consider the problem of the latter's aims. This issue is of fundamental importance since the analysis of the aims of certain measures would clarify their legal nature and function. In addition, the particular objectives of a reaction affect its legality. As correctly stated by the Institut de droit international, the state must not deflect reprisals from the objective which first led to their imposition. 10 Otherwise reprisals which were originally legal risk being characterized as illegal.
The overwhelming majority of writers when they refer (generally rather briefly) to the objectives of responses to a wrongful act, only take into consideration the reaction itself without examining its link to the wrongful act which provoked it When an event, however, is separated from its cause, it is liable to be examined under a random perspective. One is thus led towards a strong empiricism which also explains die plethora of often divergent and a priori views on the issue.
On the other hand, it may be argued, on the basis of an analysis of recent international practice, 11 that the aims of countermeasures are determined to a great 
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degree by the intrinsic features of the wrongful act its nature, its gravity, and the conventional or other origin of the obligation which was breached. In this way, a reaction which is exclusively directed against an isolated and instantaneous wrongful act-or against an act which has come to an end by the time the measures are implemented -will unavoidably appear strongly 'punitive'. With an ex post facto reaction, the injured state will not, by definition, reap any specific benefit apart from the possible moral satisfaction of imposing a kind of punishment on the author state.
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Measures of coercion are a different matter. Such measures do not have the nature of revenge or punishment for an already accomplished act, but consist of pressure on the defaulting state in order to make it alter its illegal behaviour in the future. 13 The reaction is thus carried out against a continuing violation. The measures of coercion may never be irreversible; they should be revoked as soon as the defaulting state abides by the law. The specific form of these measures depends on the nature of the illegal behaviour.
Measures of coercion will aim at compensation whenever the author state refuses to indemnify the injured state for a wrongful act If the original wrongful act is continuous -e.g. detention of diplomatic agents -the main concern of the injured state will be the termination of the illegal behaviour. This is similar to the case where the original wrongful act is a composite one, i.e. it consists of a series of particular illegal activities.
14 The reaction here has the nature of dissuasion rather than that of compensation. The pursued objective is the non-repetition in the future of the particular activities which result in the composite wrongful act Finally, measures of coercion are distinct from reactions of a purely corrective nature. These reactions do not aim at changing the behaviour of the defaulting state, but are acts of self-help stricto sensu. A typical example of such responses are those which aim at the re-establishment of the equilibrium between the parties. Such responses constitute the most common form of countermeasures applied within treaty relations. This can be explained by the fact that the breach of an international treaty 12 It must be stressed thai the Imposition of a punishment by one state on another is not accepted in contemporary international law since it is incompatible with the principle par in parent non kabet imperium, deriving from the principle of equality of states see L. often affects the whole complex of interests of the contracting parties, the balance between their mutual rights and obligations. The application of the treaty as a whole takes on a special significance given that the balancing of the rights of the parties to the treaty, which is often achieved with great difficulty during negotiations, constitutes the quintessence of conventional relations.' 5 In the end, the principle pacta sum servanda is merely the legal expression of the do ut des which governs most international treaties.
Thus, suspension of the operation of a treaty, in whole or in partr allows the injured state to reach a new equilibrium between its rights and obligations in respect to the defaulting state, being temporarily relieved of the duties under the treaty which remain without counterpart. 16 The case of the denunciation of a treaty is similar the injured party draws its conclusions from the material breach of the treaty and confirms the impossibility of maintaining burdensome relations with another contracting party when the latter ignores its obligations.
This view is reflected in Article 60 of the Vienna Convention and in its travaux priparatoiresP as well as in international practice. Thus, for example, the arbitral tribunal which judged the United States -Franci Air Services Agreement case decided that the countermeasures of the Civil Aeronautics Board against Air France were of a corrective nature in so far as they aimed to restore equality between the contracting parties.
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It follows from the above that the specific features of conventional relations, and consequently of illegal acts consisting of breaches of international treaties, directly affect the aims of the responses in a given context Accordingly, although in most cases reprisals have a coercive character, denunciation and suspension of the application of a treaty generally have a corrective aim, which is called for by the imbalance caused by the breach in the complex of reciprocal rights and obligations of the parties.
B. The Legal Capacity to React
The breach of a rule of international law creates new relationships between defaulting and injured states. The problem here is whether the circle of states entitled to react by way of reprisals corresponds to the group of states entitled to respond by denouncing or suspending an international treaty.
It must be stressed at the outset that the greatest majority of international wrongful acts (or omissions) belong to the category of international delicts. Delicts create, as a same principle is reflected in Article 60 paragraph 2(b) of the Vienna Convention, which provides that in the case of material breach of a multilateral treaty the specially affected party is entitled to suspend the operation of the treaty in its bilateral relations with the defaulting state. As the ILC stated in its final report on the law of treaties:
in the case of a multilateral treaty the interests of the other parties have to be taken into account, and a right of suspension normally provides adequate protection to the state specially affected by the breach.
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There are, however, cases where a third state, without being the target of a reaction, may be indirectly affected by it An act of reprisal which affects the rights of a third state leads usually to the international responsibility of the reacting state vis-d-vis the third state. The wrongfulness of such an act may be precluded only by virtue of other circumstances precluding wrongfulness, such as the third state's consent, a state of necessity, etc.
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The situation in the law of treaties is comparable. The problem arises in regard to the so-called 'integral treaties' in which Article 60 paragraph 2(c) of the Vienna Convention applies. It has correctly been stressed that a state injured by the breach of such a treaty cannot suspend the performance of its obligations towards the defaulting state without at the same time infringing the rights of the other parties. 23 The ILC confronted this difficulty and decided that the best possible solution was to permit the injured state to suspend operation of the treaty not in its bilateral relations with the defaulting state, but in its relations with all the parties. The aim of this proposal, which was finally adopted by the Vienna Conference, was to avoid the fragmentation of multilateral relations into partial bilateral relations, something not compatible with the specific nature of 'integral' treaties. This compromise solution is, nevertheless, still more favourable to the injured state than to the other parties, whose rights in any case risk being affected by a unilateral suspension of the treaty. The ratio of Article 60 paragraph 2(c) is to favour, in a borderline case, the position of the injured state not against, but despite the rights of third states. Thus, it would be no exaggeration to consider this case a kind of state of necessity.
D. The Procedural Requirements
In a legal order such as international law, which is not highly formalistic, it would be almost Utopian to believe that a reaction to a wrongful act outside an institutional framework could be submitted to strict formalities. It is true that reprisals and unilateral denunciation or suspension of the operation of a treaty often constitute an reacting immediately, without taking any preliminary procedural steps. However, this should only be accepted in case of wrongful acts of exceptional gravity, or in case of especially urgent circumstances.
The exceptional gravity of a wrongful act indicates the commission of an international crime or the violation of an erga omnes obligation. The criterion of gravity of the wrongful act is undoubtedly the soundest for basing an exception to the subsidiary character of countermeasures. Indeed, as has been stressed by the ILC, the distinction between international delicts and international crimes would only be of academic interest if it was not to be followed by concrete legal consequences. 29 The arguments supporting the view that international crimes justify immediate reaction are the following: due to its gravity, the wrongful act is often so well known that there is no risk of subjective or arbitrary assessment of the facts. Moreover, in cases of blatant violation of international law any effort towards friendly settlement either is out of the question, or is doomed to failure. Finally, the commission of an international crime creates, as a rule, a situation in which any loss of time -which necessarily accompanies preliminary procedures -may result in most serious consequences. On this point let it be noted that the aforementioned arguments are valid mainly in the case of a directly injured state, such as the US in the Tehran hostage affair. 30 The other states normally need to call for the United Nations' intervention before acting on their own initiative.
Apart from the case of the commission of an international crime or the violation of an obligation erga omnes, the need for immediate reaction may also arise in other especially urgent circumstances. As was noted by several representatives at the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly in the context of recent discussions on international responsibility, such an escape clause is indispensable. 31 It is significant that Article 65(2) of the Vienna Convention includes a similar reservation. The term 'especially urgent circumstances' must in any case be defined on the basis of specific criteria; otherwise the principle of the subsidiary character of the reaction to a wrongful act will be devoid of practical significance.
One such basic criterion is the intrinsic nature of the wrongful act itself. As a rule, only a continuous wrongful act can lead to urgent reaction with the aim of coercing the defaulting state to end its illegal behaviour. This, however, does not mean that every such wrongful act constitutes an especially urgent circumstance that permits immediate reaction, as has been argued. 32 This position carries the risk of leading to the rejection of the subsidiary character of countermeasures, given that in practice the states decide in most cases to react to continuous breaches. Moreover, state practice contradicts this position. It is characteristic, for example, that in the United StatesFrance Air Services Agreement case, the US Government emphasized the continuous nature of the violation of the agreement which it attributed to France, while stressing, however, the obligation to attempt a friendly settlement 33 It seems therefore that the continuous character of the wrongful act, although necessary, isnot sufficient to permit immediate reaction. In die author's opinion, the existence of a danger of irreversible damage to the injured state is also necessary. In any case, especially urgent circumstances only allow the application of temporary measures which tend to ensure the status quo. In other words, only the reactions which have the nature of interim measures of protection may be justified in such circumstances, such as, for instance, the freezing of assets of the author state deposited in banks under the jurisdiction of the injured state.
II. The Substance of Reactions
Thus far the preconditions for lawful reprisals and denunciation or suspension of a treaty have been examined. The substance of such reactions also needs to be discussed, and particularly the rules they infringe, their extent and their legal effects.
A. The Infringed Roles
As mentioned above, a common feature of reprisals and denunciation or suspension is that in themselves they are contrary to certain rules of international law. Their wrongfulness is precluded only if both the preliminary conditions already examined and certain substantive conditions examined below are met In the present context two questions arise: i) what limits are set by general international law on the discretionary power of the state to infringe, by its reaction, a rule of law? Are they identical in the case of reprisals and denunciation or suspension? ii) what is the difference between reprisals and conventional reactions regarding the infringed legal rule?
The traditional school of international law either did not raise the issue of the discretionary power of the injured state, or argued that this state had, in principle, complete freedom of choice as to the international rules which it could infringe by its response. 34 This view was based, implicitly in most cases, on two closely interwoven axiomatic propositions: a) that the reciprocity principle, die cornerstone of international relations, did not yield to exceptions; and b) that no hierarchy existed between international norms. It is indeed obvious that if all the rules of the international legal order were placed on the same level in terms of hierarchy, then the principle lex spedalis derogat legi generali could always be applied. This means diat me rule allowing countermeasures would systematically prevail, as a special rule, over the substantive -or 'primary' -rale infringed. Thus, the wrongfulness ofjhe reaction would be precluded regardless of the content and nature of this primary rule.
Such a view, however, does not conform to contemporary developments in international law, which have led to the rejection of levelling of the rules of the international legal order. The existence of a hierarchy between rules -although it is at times unclear -is nowadays indisputable. As a consequence, if a primary rule is hierarchically superior to the rule allowing countermeasures, the former will constitute an obstacle in the implementation of the latter. There are in fact certain rules creating 'absolute' obligations which do not permit derogation under any circumstances, even in the form of countermeasures. If such a rule is violated by state A, injured state B may not avoid its application by invoking its capacity to adopt countermeasures. Reciprocity, in the narrower sense of the term, is inconceivable in the case of rules creating absolute obligations.
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Peremptory norms constitute the nucleus of diese rules. The notion of jus cogens does not only relate to the nullity of international treaties. It also extends to unilateral acts or actions, 36 such as countermeasures. It is significant that in the context of the draft articles on state responsibility, the former Special Rapporteur W. Riphagen had proposed a provision excluding countermeasures consisting of the suspension of performance of obligations arising from peremptory norms. This proposal was supported in both the discussions of the ILC and the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, where many state representatives stated that the rules of jus cogens constitute a barrier to the application of countermeasures. The same opinion seems to be held by the present ILC Special Rapporteur Professor G. Arangio-Ruiz. linos-Alexander Sicilumos treaties. Sir Humphrey Waldock, characteristically noted, the right to denounce or suspend the operation of a breached treaty does not influence the other rights of the injured state as regards reprisals.
41 Actually, the ILC explicitly reserved the right of the injured state to resort to reprisals. 42 Moreover, Article 73 of the Vienna Convention stipulates that 'the provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudge any question that may arise in regard to a treaty... from the international responsibility of a State*. Granted that reprisals fall indisputedly within the field of international responsibility, this provision functions as a reservation on the possibility of carrying out reprisals because of the violation of an international treaty. While these reprisals cannot oppose jus cogens rules or erga omnes obligations, they may touch upon customary rules, unilateral obligations, general principles of law, as well as treaty rules regulating a field of interstate relations not connected in any way to the one governed by the breached treaty. In other words, the breach of an international treaty may justify reprisals beyond the specific conventional 'sub-system'.
The opposite, however, may also be the case: die violation of non-conventional obligations -customary or otherwise -may constitute a justification for the nonperformance of treaty obligations in the form of reprisals. As shown by international practice, in most cases reprisals are characterized by the non-existence of symmetry or a close relationship between the rule violated by the wrongful act and the rule infringed by the reaction of die injured state. 43 As a result, the difference between reprisals and denunciation or suspension of treaties according to Article 60 of the Vienna Convention is that die former are not usually located in die specific context of interstate relations in which the violated rule belongs, whereas conventional reactions are closely connected to the breach.
B. The Legal Effects of the Reactions
Besides die fact that reactions to wrongful acts infringe upon certain rules of international law and, as a consequence, upon the rights of the defaulting state deriving from There is a case, however, where irreversible reprisals do not constitute 'punishment', but merely aim to enforce judicial decisions or arbitral awards which the defaulting state has ignored. It is well known that after Albania's refusal to grant the United Kingdom the compensation provided for by the Id judgment in the Corfu Channel case, 50 the British authorities attempted to seize Albanian public assets and property on British territory in an attempt to enforce the Court's judgment 51 The attempt was not successful. If it had succeeded it would have constituted an act of reprisal, per se incompatible with the principle of immunity of the property of foreign states. However, the credibility and effectiveness of international decisions would have been seriously jeopardized if international law did not permit a state, in favour of which a final decision has been passed by an international jurisdictional organ, to proceed with enforcement in the event of intransigence by the other party. 52 In this case the injured state does not act on the basis of its own subjective appreciation of the facts and the law, but upon the objective assessment of an international court or tribunal. Moreover, reprisals respond to a double illegality: to the initial violation ascertained by the tribunal and to the non-execution of its decision. This is therefore not merely an exceptional, but rather a borderline case where irreversible reprisals must be accepted. The situation appears different in the context of conventional reactions. Even though the possibility of denunciation is significantly restricted by Article 60 of the Vienna Convention, it is recognized independently of any international decision. The state injured by a material breach of a bilateral treaty may denounce it on its own initiative, while in the case of multilateral treaties the denunciation is subject to the unanimous agreement of the parties, with the exception of the defaulting one. According to Article 70 of the Vienna Convention, unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, the denunciation releases the. parties from their obligation to perform the treaty, without however affecting rights, obligations or legal situations already created through the execution of the treaty. In other words, the denunciation terminates ex nunc the legal rule, abolishing for the future the legal regime established by the treaty. At this point denunciation differs from irreversible reprisals, given that the latter do not abolish the primary rule of law: they merely constitute its definite non-application in the specific case. However, it is also possible for denunciation not to result in abolition of the primary rule, if, and to the extent that, the treaty codifies customary law. In this case, the rule continues to be in force as customary law, on the basis of the non-existence of hierarchy between treaty and custom.
As a conclusion one could maintain that irreversible reprisals constitute an extreme case, while in the context of conventional relations denunciation is recognized within a broader range, even though it still remains the exception. This variation is mainly due to the different functions of these two forms of reaction: reprisals have mainly a coercive aim, while denunciation tends towards balancing the interests of the parties.
C. The Principle of Proportionality
The obligation to respect the principle of proportionality during the application of countermeasures is generally accepted in contemporary international law. However, views differ significantly in regard to its meaning and content; this may be attributed to the flexibility and fluidity of the concept of proportionality.
One may propose two basic criteria for delimiting the concept i) the effects, or even better, the results of both the wrongful act and the reaction; and ii) the objective which the injured state wishes to achieve by its reaction. In other words, countermeasures are in conformity with the proportionality principle if their effects are proportional to the gravity of the situation created by the illegal behaviour for the injured state, as well as with respect to the desired aim, as this is determined by the nature of the violation.
Despite these clarifications, the proportionality principle always remains flexible and there is unavoidably an increased measure of subjectivity in assessing how it will be upheld in any specific situation. The fluidity of this principle is especially evident in the case of reprisals. This is due to the fact that, as stated above, the rule of law violated and the one the response infringes usually belong to different fields. The looser the connection between wrongful act and reaction, the more difficult the assessment and comparison of the effects of one on the other. On the contrary, in the case of denunciation or suspension of a breached treaty, the close connection between violation and reaction facilitates the comparison of their respective effects.
For this reason in particular, it should not be surprising that Article 60 of the Vienna Convention does not expressly refer to the proportionality principle. This however, does not mean that this principle is not applicable in the case of denunciation or suspension of a treaty. In fact, contrary to what has been argued in the -past, 33 an unimportant breach does not justify a radical reversal of the treaty status. Examination of international practice proves that even before the Vienna Convention, the states usually invoked 'serious', 'significant' or 'manifest' violations of a treaty in order to justify its denunciation or suspension.
As the International Court of Justice declared in its Advisory opinion on the Namibia case, 54 Article 60 of the Vienna Convention codifies customary law, which stipulates in paragraphs 1 and 2 that only a material breach of a treaty can be invoked as a ground for its denunciation or suspension. The Court especially referred to paragraph 3 of the same Article, according to which a material breach is defined as repudiation of the treaty or as violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of its object or purpose. The combination of these three paragraphs implies that the proportionality principle is not only recognized by Article 60, but, on the contrary, it co-exists and is inherent therein. It is in fact characteristic that during the Vienna Conference, as well as in the most recent international practice, this principle was referred to repeatedly in relation to Article 60. 55 It therefore follows that the restrictions that involve the proportionality principle are valid just as much for reprisals as for the denunciation or suspension of a breached treaty. Despite the uncertainties that may arise in practice concerning the meaning of 'material breach', the proportionality principle is much more evident in the case of denunciation or suspension than with regard to reprisals.
Conclusion
It follows from the above that neither of the two diametrically opposed views maintained in regard to the relation between reprisals and denunciation or suspension of a breached treaty fully reflects reality. The one which differentiates the two institutions in an absolute manner clearly overlooks their significant similarities. The other while identifying them, does not take their differences into account Given however that the similarities clearly outweigh the differences, reprisals and conventional responses can be regulated by a common regime in the context of the draft articles on state responsibility. Both reprisals and denunciation or suspension constitute 'countermeasures' in the broadest sense of the word. Any exclusion of treaty reactions from the scope of application of these draft articles wouldjnean exclusion of one part of the consequences of fhe wrongful act from the field of state responsibility. This cannot be justified theoretically and may also lead to inconsistencies and confusion in international practice.
